moment to highlight that it is not clear whether the high prices for human smuggling are brought about because of the fact that human smugglers pocket huge profit margins or are best explained by the average costs of organizing human smuggling. Pocketing huge profit margins is usually only possible over a longer stretch of time, in case one can achieve a monopoly or some sort of cartel. At the same time, the evidence does not support the case that human smugglers can secure any kind of monopoly. Reitano and Tinti (2015: 25), for instance, write that ‘‘due to modern communication technology and the proliferation of social media, there is near constant communication among migrants at source and in transit, with common messaging boards and apps providing the average price along key legs of the journey.’’ Baumgärtner et al. (2015) report that ‘‘[s]mugglers don’t just look for potential custom …

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hello 🙂 please i need help with reading response and i attach the reading Muller down below and i attach the reading response form thank you for your help

 

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READING RESPONSE FORM Your name:________________________ Author and title: INSTRUCTIONS: You can fill this in either by hand or type your responses into the form, but either way, you must fill up the entire form, and you can’t do so by quoting the author, giving your own opinions (except in the section for your objections and comments), or making your writing as large as possible. If you type, you can double-space. You must hand this in as a hard copy in class on the night we discuss the reading for the first time. It won’t count if it is sent by email, or comes in later than that night, or it’s not filled up. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Author’s thesis: List the author’s main arguments: List the main objections the author discusses: What objections or comments do you have on this reading, or on some part of it? EJPT Article The ethics of commercial human smuggling European Journal of Political Theory 0(0) 1–19 ! The Author(s) 2018 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1474885118754468 journals.sagepub.com/home/ept Julian F. Müller Brown University, USA Abstract Even though human smuggling is one of the central topics of contention in the political discourse about immigration, it has received virtually no attention from moral philosophy. This article aims to fill this gap and provide a moral analysis of commercial human smuggling. The article accomplishes this by analyzing whether the moral outrage against human smugglers during the European refugee crisis can be justified. To do this, the article first analyzes whether (commercial) human smuggling is inherently wrong. Answering this question in the negative, this article then asks whether the wholesale condemnation of human smuggling in the European case can nevertheless be justified by recourse to a nation-state’s purported right to political self-determination. Keywords Human smuggling, immigration, migration, people smuggling, refugee crisis Introduction In the wake of the European refugee crisis, not one day has passed by without a high-ranking politician condemning human smuggling. They have demanded that ‘‘Europe must take even more decisive action against human smugglers,’’ celebrated military operations against smugglers as an ‘‘impressive symbol of determination and solidarity’’ (Gebauer et al., 2014), and called out commercial human smuggling for being a ‘‘disgusting crime’’ (ARD, 2015). Even international organizations have been quick to morally condemn organized human smuggling. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2010b: 29), for instance, has recently published a 300-page handbook titled Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants. The public thus finds itself in a situation, as van Liempt and Sersli (2013: 2) point out, in which it is constantly confronted with the ‘‘[d]iscursive associations between smugglers and crime [. . .] by politicians, the media, and academics.’’ Corresponding author: Julian F. Müller, Political Theory Project, Brown University, Box 2005, 8 Fones Alley, Providence, RI 02906, USA. Email: julian_mueller@brown.edu 2 European Journal of Political Theory 0(0) However, from a purely moral point of view, it does not seem obvious that this round-about moral condemnation against human smugglers is justified. First off, human smuggling should not be confused with human trafficking. While human trafficking concerns ‘‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force’’ (UNODC, 2004: 42, emphasis added), commercial human smuggling is defined as ‘‘the procurement, in order to obtain [. . .] a financial or other material benefit of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’’ (UNODC, 2004: 54).1 Moreover, human smuggling rings are often the only way for refugees and other people in desperate need to escape unjust states of affairs and find sanctuary. Even the UN recognizes that human smugglers are often the only way for refugees and the destitute to get out of harm’s way. Against this background, some might ask whether we should instead praise human smugglers for helping the worst-off to secure their rights, rather than condemning them. At the very least, these preliminary thoughts should motivate us to articulate a more nuanced view on the moral status of human smuggling. In the recent decade, there has been a surge of interest in political philosophy and ethics with respect to the morality of immigration. The most prominent issue in immigration ethics is surely whether nation-states have the moral right to exclude people from immigrating into their territory. Other questions in immigration ethics include whether wealthy nations have different obligations to refugees and the desperately poor, whether highly-skilled immigrants in some circumstances have an obligation to remain in their country of origin, whether citizenship should be for sale, and how nation-states should deal with the fact that globally, millions of people in the foreseeable future will try their best to cross the borders into wealthy nations in the hope of a better life. Although philosophers have spent much time and ink discussing the morality of immigration, the moral status of human smuggling is an issue that has been virtually absent from academic discussion in philosophy. That human smuggling is indeed an issue that is usually overlooked in migration ethics is reflected in the fact that the most recent treatises on the morality of immigration, David Miller’s (2016) Strangers in Our Midst and Joseph Carens’s (2013) The Ethics of Immigration, fail to provide an analysis of the moral status of human smuggling and indeed do not even flag the issue as one of philosophical concern. This is curious as human smuggling is one of the core issues—as pointed out earlier—in the public debate about immigration. William Smith (2015: 90) recently noted that the literature in immigration ethics mainly focuses ‘‘on the morality of border controls’’ while mostly ignoring issues concerning the morality of border crossing.2 This is an unfortunate situation, as it entails, as he rightly points out, ‘‘that political theory offers little guidance about the normative issues raised by unauthorised economic migration, understood as unlawful entry to or residence in a state by persons from less wealthy societies looking to enhance their occupational opportunities.’’3 In this article, I want to discuss a specific aspect of border crossing, namely, the moral status of human smuggling, an issue that is both politically important as well as philosophically understudied.4 Müller 3 The motivating question that drives this article is whether the public outcry against human smugglers in the wake of the European refugee crisis was justified, and if so, for what reason. I approach this question in three parts. The first part is purely analytical and aims to provide a better understanding of the moral status of human smuggling in general.5 The second part inquires whether the public moral condemnation of human smugglers in the European case can be justified on other grounds. In particular, I will be concerned with whether the public wholesale condemnation can be grounded in the nation-state’s purported right to selfdetermination. The goal of the third part is to discuss some of the moral and empirical implications of my results. In particular, I will be concerned with the question of how Europe could respect the right of the desperately poor and persecuted to apply for sanctuary, given real-world feasibility constraints. Is commercial human smuggling inherently wrong? There are various reasons why someone might object to human smuggling. To help us work through them, consider the following example. There are two islands: The first island, island A, is generally known to be a failing state that is poor and persecutes some marginalized groups. Its political and economic institutions are dysfunctional in such a way that the basic needs of a large part of society are not met. Imagine further that there is an island B. Island B is a wealthy modern democracy. At the shore of island A, there is Bert, who is unjustly persecuted and whose minimal needs are not satisfied by his home country. Bert seeks to apply for sanctuary in island B. Let us further imagine that Bert has a certain amount of cash—maybe he has just sold his apartment, so he is now able to pay an agent to ferry him over the sea to island B. Now imagine there is Anna. Anna is an average person, neither rich nor poor, she has a boat, and for some reason she can travel freely between A and B.6 The main goal of the first part is now to ascertain whether commercial human smuggling is inherently wrong. In general, we can distinguish between acts that are inherently wrong and acts that are contingently wrong. Acts that are inherently wrong go down as a minus on the moral balance sheet regardless of the circumstances. Paradigmatic cases of inherently wrong acts are rape and killing people.7 The very act of raping or killing goes down as a negative in the moral balance sheet regardless of what other values could be secured by these acts. That is not to say that there is no situation in which there would be a trumping reason so that killing could be justified—say, in cases of self-defense—but nevertheless, the act of killing goes down as a minus in the moral balance sheet.8 In contrast, there are acts that are only wrong for contingent reasons. Imagine, for instance, that Anna plays a fast-paced video game. Usually, there is nothing wrong with playing such computer games. Now imagine, however, that her friend Lucy, who suffers from epilepsy, is with her. In this case, we might be justified in blaming Anna for starting that computer game, given that she knows of her friend’s condition. An act that is only contingently wrong is thus an act that does not necessarily go down as a negative in the moral balance sheet, but can, if only for contingent reasons. 4 European Journal of Political Theory 0(0) Case 1: Anna ferries Bert from island A to island B for free Let us first discuss the case of non-commercial human smuggling to get a better understanding of the thought experiment and the issues at stake. Imagine that Anna ferries Bert from island A, where his human rights are severely threatened, to island B, where he is safe and able to exercise his basic human rights. Let us further imagine that Bert is legally permitted to enter island B. For our example, it is not important whether Bert might be able to provide for himself by taking a job in B or whether B will endow him with the basic goods he needs to exercise his rights. Furthermore, given that Anna has bent no law and has provided free passage for Bert, who was in desperate need of help, it seems quite obvious that Anna’s act of ferrying Bert to island B seems to be morally permissible. Since Anna has no particular responsibility to help Bert, her behavior might be judged morally praiseworthy. How praiseworthy Anna’s actions are, however, seems to depend on contingent facts. For instance, if Anna put herself in great danger by landing in A to take Bert on board, or if she incurred great monetary costs for ferrying Bert from A to B (she may have needed to rent an ocean-going ship) we would judge her action morally praiseworthy. On the other hand, if Anna would have just landed her private yacht in A to spend a few sunny days on the gorgeous beaches of A and planned to go to B anyhow, then her act of ferrying Bert to B might still seem praiseworthy but surely not to the same extent as in the first case. Case 2: Anna illegally ferries Bert from island A to island B for free Now, let us assume that by crossing the border of B, Bert is actually breaking the law of island B. I take it that we usually understand human smuggling as involving an illegal entry on the side of the smuggled. The new question is whether breaking the law makes human smuggling inherently bad. To approach this question, we might ask whether every type of action that involves breaking codified law is wrong. It is easy to come up with a lot of actions like stealing, killing and scamming that at first glance seem to be pro tanto wrongs because they involve breaking the law. If we look more closely, however, we notice that we would judge these actions morally wrong even in the case that this country’s set of laws would permit stealing, killing, and scamming. What is the reason for that? The reason seems to be that these types of actions are not wrong because they are against the law, but because they are against morality. It seems to me that whether we are obliged to follow the law or obliged to break the law is dependent on the moral status of the law (or body of laws). We might thus say that a type of action is inherently wrong if it necessarily involves breaking a morally justified law. The question then becomes whether human smuggling necessarily involves breaking justified law. Here, the answer seems to be straightforward. While human smuggling might contingently involve breaking justified law, it does not do so necessarily. For instance, imagine the case that Bert has a morally legitimate claim to obtain sanctuary in B, but at the same time, a morally unjustified legislation prevents him Müller 5 from crossing the border to B and claiming asylum. In that case, since the law that prevents him from entering the country would be by definition unjustified, he would be at liberty to cross the border to B.9 This case is particularly interesting since it seems to adequately model the situation of a great many refugees, as I will explain later, in the current European crisis. It is interesting here to draw attention to two central documents of the United Nation’s Office of Drugs and Crime. In their Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants, the UNODC (2010b: 29) takes great pains to point out that the Smuggling Protocol10 ‘‘does not intend to criminalize migration as such.’’ The Protocol, the UNODC explains, does not aim to criminalize ‘‘person and entities, such as family members and non-governmental or religious groups, who facilitate the illegal entry of migrants for non-profit reasons’’ (UNODC, 2010b: 29). What kind of human smuggling does the Protocol then aim to criminalize? According to the UNODC’s (2010b: 29) Toolkit, ‘‘the criminalization of smuggling of migrants and related conduct covers only those who profit from smuggling of migrants through financial or other material gain.’’ However, this raises the question of what, if anything, is wrong with commercial human smuggling. Case 3: Anna illegally ferries Bert from island A to island B for a fair fee Let us then consider the next case. It is similar to the second case, but for one difference: the commercial aspect, which is another feature that we commonly associate with human smuggling. Remember that in our example, Anna is not particularly rich, but an average earner who happens to have a boat suitable for ferrying refugees. Further, remember that Bert has some amount of money. The question is now whether our moral judgment of the smuggling case changes if we inject money into the equation. Since our judgment surely depends in part on the amount of money Anna charges, I want to distinguish the case in which she takes a fair fee from the case in which she charges an exploitatively high price. Let’s take on first the case in which Anna charges a fair fee. This raises the question of what we mean by a fair fee. As is generally acknowledged, the question of what a fair price amounts to is a difficult one. For the purpose of this argument, we can assume that Anna charges a fee that both parties judge as fair and that an impartial spectator would judge as reasonable. Now, does her taking a fair fee for her services somehow transform her action into a morally blameworthy one? To put it differently, is it the commodification of assisting Bert that makes Anna’s act blameworthy? There are a few things to consider here: in ferrying Bert from A to B, Anna incurs considerable costs. She might need to pay back a loan for her boat; she might also have to provide food for herself and Bert during the passage. Furthermore, she needs to account for the natural wear and tear of her boat. Then there are the opportunity costs she accrues by ferrying Bert across the sea instead of working a full-time job. Keeping in mind that Bert possesses the required funds, there seems to be nothing wrong with Anna charging Bert a fair fee. 6 European Journal of Political Theory 0(0) There is also a related case to consider that is important for our discussion. In many circumstances, there are actually a lot of people who wish to be ferried to B. Given that Anna wants to help as many desperately poor people as possible, it would even be irrational for her to ferry Bert for free. In a situation where many people are in need of her services, Anna needs to make sure that her boat is in a condition to make a safe passage. Furthermore, she needs to make enough money to take care of her own needs and those of her dependents. Indeed, it would be prudent for her to build savings in case she needs to pay for repairs. In this scenario, even though Anna charges a fair fee, some might deem her actions not only morally permissible but even praiseworthy, considering that dealing with sanctuary-seekers will inevitably be more dangerous than a normal job. Case 4: Anna illegally ferries Bert from island A to island B for a very high price So far, I have only looked at cases which—at least, after some initial reflection— seem relatively uncontroversial. Next, I want to look at a case that is more difficult to evaluate but might be closer to what we associate with commercial human smuggling. Let us assume that Anna offers to ferry Bert to B for a very high price, even an exorbitantly high price. Would there be anything morally wrong with that? The answer seems to be: not necessarily. Many goods and services are very costly because the input factors to create a specific good X or service Y are themselves very expensive. A ferry service seems to be one of these things, since offering a ferry service might include buying a boat, paying maintenance fees, paying salaries for the crew, and so on. Charging a high price for a service, thus, does not necessarily constitute a moral wrong. What we are concerned with are thus not high prices per se, but unfairly high prices. To put it differently, in this section, we are interested in how our moral judgment of Anna’s behavior changes if she charges exploitatively high prices. Before I grapple with this problem, I want to pause here for a moment to highlight that it is not clear whether the high prices for human smuggling are brought about because of the fact that human smugglers pocket huge profit margins or are best explained by the average costs of organizing human smuggling. Pocketing huge profit margins is usually only possible over a longer stretch of time, in case one can achieve a monopoly or some sort of cartel. At the same time, the evidence does not support the case that human smugglers can secure any kind of monopoly. Reitano and Tinti (2015: 25), for instance, write that ‘‘due to modern communication technology and the proliferation of social media, there is near constant communication among migrants at source and in transit, with common messaging boards and apps providing the average price along key legs of the journey.’’ Baumgärtner et al. (2015) report that ‘‘[s]mugglers don’t just look for potential custom …
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