i.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of identity in the decision to participate in geno-cide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or against that argument.

Theories that attempt to explain why formerly peaceable neighbors kill one another in genocidal violence focus on top-down factors, such as the state, as well as bottom-up factors, such as group ties and social interaction.

(a)  Read through the theories of the Rwandan genocide put forth by Mamdani (2001), Straus (2006), andFujii (2009).

Get Your Custom Essay Written From Scratch
We have worked on a similar problem. If you need help click order now button and submit your assignment instructions.
Just from $9/Page
Order Now

? (b)Using the personal interviews with perpetrators in the Hatzfield (2006) reading to support your argument:

i.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of identity in the decision to participate in geno-cide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or against that argument.

ii.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of state institutions in the decision to partici-pate in genocide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or against thatargument.

iii.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of social pressure and groups in the decision to participate in genocide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or againstthat argument.

(c)  In answering this question, make sure to describe at least two authors’ arguments, and to use at least three different pieces of evidence.

 

Explanation & Answer length: 1200 word

UNFORMATTED ATTACHMENT PREVIEW

Killing Neighbors WEBS OF VIOLENCE I N R WA N D A Lee Ann Fujii Cornell University Press Ithaca and London This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:26:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Copyright © 2009 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2009 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2011 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing neighbors : webs of violence in Rwanda / Lee Ann Fujii. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-4705-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-8014-7713-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Genocide—Rwanda. 2. Violence—Rwanda. 3. Ethnic conflict—Rwanda. 4. Political violence—Rwanda. 5. Rwanda— History—Civil War, 1990-1993—Atrocities. 6. Rwanda—History— Civil War, 1994—Atrocities. 7. Rwanda—Ethnic relations. I. Title. DT450.435.F85 2009 967.57104’2–dc22 2008034134 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu. Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Paperback printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:26:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction Genocide among Neighbors Édouard did not look the part. None of the rural men and women who participated in the Rwandan genocide did. Their lives revolved around work, chores, children, and church, not mass murder. Édouard was typical in this regard. He was born in a rural community rung by the Virunga Mountains, the range made famous by Dian Fossey’s gorillas. He grew up to become a farmer, married, had four children. Among his neighbors was a Tutsi family. He and his neighbor were not close, but each “still played the role of neighbor,” helping one another and sharing good times. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a guerrilla army comprised of mostly Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, Édouard began to hear rumors that his own Tutsi neighbor—and indeed, everyone’s Tutsi neighbor—were secretly supporting the RPF. For Édouard, the RPF threat had become all too real. In January 1991, the rebel army had launched an attack on the nearest town, less than twenty kilometers away. To help protect his community, Édouard and a dozen other men arranged to go to his Tutsi neighbor’s house to root out the RPF accomplices the man was allegedly hiding. When the group arrived, several men surrounded the house. Édouard threw rocks on the roof to make the man come out. The man emerged, brandishing a machete, and managed to strike the first blow. The group killed him instantly. Inside they found no accomplices, only the man’s frightened sisters and mother. The murder of Édouard’s neighbor at the hands of other neighbors was no isolated incident. In a wholly different part of the country lived Olivier, a man who spent his childhood years in Kigali. His family eventually moved south, to the center of the country, where Olivier grew up to become aThis mason. He married and had seven children. Though his own wife content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 2 Killing Neighbors was Hutu, other members of his family had married Tutsi. Olivier also had several Tutsi neighbors. Close interrelations with Tutsi were typical for the region. When the war began in October 1990, daily life continued as before. Political parties were starting to form, which threatened the oneparty state that had ruled Rwanda for nearly two decades. The emergence of new parties created palpable tensions, even violence, in many parts of the country, but Olivier’s family steered clear of politics and experienced no problems. Everything changed on 6 April 1994, when assailants shot down the plane carrying President Habyarimana as it tried to land at the airport in Kigali. Almost immediately, a new authority took over Olivier’s secteur and began organizing local men to burn and loot Tutsi homes. Olivier was among those recruited. He was a particularly active recruit, never hesitating to carry out any order the new authority issued. Even when the order came to kill all the Tutsi, Olivier obliged. He obliged so often that by his own estimate, he took part in nearly every killing in his community. What made Édouard and Olivier turn on their Tutsi neighbors? What made these men kill? The genocide was no homegrown project. It was sponsored and conceived from above, by a small group of powerful extremists in President Habyarimana’s regime. These mighty few objected to the power-sharing terms of a recently signed peace agreement between Habyarimana and the RPF. Through genocide, they sought to maintain their monopoly on power. The slaughter began on 6 April 1994, shortly after assailants shot down the plane carrying the president. Within hours, specially trained militia, soldiers, and Presidential Guard began going door to door with lists of targets, which included anyone—Hutu or Tutsi—not firmly in the extremists’ camp. The killers dispatched their victims with gruesome efficiency. Militia simultaneously set up roadblocks across the city to prevent escape, killing anyone with a Tutsi identity card and anyone who “looked” Tutsi. Outside the capital, the violence followed a different path. Killings began at different times in different regions (Straus 2006, 53–64). Soldiers, professional militia, and National Police continued to play a leading role in perpetrating violence, but rural residents also did their part. Local elites and political entrepreneurs used the crisis of the president’s assassination to seize power in their communities and began enlisting residents into genocide. Some people refused. Others found ways to avoid participating. Many, however, joined in the killings. Despite long-standing, mostlyThis amicable, relations with their victims, these peasant-killers went content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 3 about their task in determined fashion. They trapped victims at roadblocks, lured them to public buildings, and descended on their homes and hiding places. They killed the young and old, the healthy and infirm, men as well as women, mostly Tutsi but thousands of Hutu as well. What explains this transformation from peasant to génocidaire? How do ordinary people come to commit mass violence against their own neighbors, friends, and family? The question of intimate mass violence constitutes a central puzzle in the study of political violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 846). The question is even more puzzling in the African context since most African states lack the ability to mobilize outside capital cities or other urban centers (Straus 2004b, 12). From a rationalist perspective, popular participation in mass slaughter is puzzling because people are better off under conditions of peace than violence. It makes no sense for masses to support elite projects of genocide or ethnic cleansing, when it is the masses who incur most of the costs, and elites, most of the benefits (de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999, 262). The puzzle becomes even more disturbing when the targets of violence are people whom the killers have known as friends, neighbors, and family. Neighbors are not supposed to kill neighbors, let alone commit genocide against them. Indeed, long-standing, interethnic ties of the sort that typified relations in Rwanda should preclude, not facilitate, participation in mass violence (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Varshney 1997).1 Killing at close range, moreover, is grisly work, as the ordinary men of Police Battalion 101 knew firsthand after marching thousands of Jewish civilians into the forest and shooting them in the back of the neck (Browning 1992). So, too, is killing a person one sees as occupying the same “moral universe” as oneself, and thus entitled to the same norms of protection (Fein 1979).2 What is perhaps most difficult of all is to kill a person one knows and regards in positive terms, for killing kith and kin is more than just a physical act; it is an act of social violation. It destroys not just bodies, but bonds. 1. Scholars have also noted social capital’s “dark side” (Portes 1998, 15–18; Colletta and Cullen 2000; Mann 2005, 21; Kalyvas 2006, 14). 2. A clear example of Fein’s notion of “moral universe” is found in Walzer (1977), where he quotes from memoirs of soldiers who refrained from shooting an enemy combatant when the enemy soldier did something that made him look “human,” such as lighting a cigarette or pulling up his pants. As Walzer (1977, 139) explains: “A soldier who looks funny is not at that moment a military threat; he is not a fighting man but simply a man, and one does not kill men.” This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 4 Killing Neighbors Foils and Foibles: A Second Look at Ethnicity-based Approaches The usual approach to resolving this puzzle is to point to ethnicity as the key driver of violence. In ethnicity-based approaches, violence is the outcome of ethnic group relations, which are inherently competitive and often antagonistic. The type of violence that occurs, such as atrocities or mass murder, are supposed indicators of the power of ethnic levers at work. The more extensive or brutal the violence, the greater the antagonisms must have been. Ethnicity-based approaches thus locate causes in the nature of ethnic groups themselves—the collective attributes or tendencies that unite people under a common ethnic label. These attributes and tendencies may be constructed or ancient. They may be modern or old, real or imagined. No matter their origin, they turn Serbs, Sunni, and Hutu into clearly bounded ethnic groups. Under the right conditions, these approaches assert, ethnic groups will commit violence against “enemy” groups. Two of the most commonly posited pathways to mass-based violence are “ethnic hatreds” and “ethnic fears.”3 For purposes of clarity, I treat these two approaches as distinct though some scholars combine the two. The “ethnic hatred” thesis views collective hatreds as an integral part of ethnic group identities. According to this thesis, ethnic hatreds can persist over generations, even centuries, through myth, memory, or both. Despite the passage of time, these hatreds do not necessarily lessen or alter but remain dormant and even “simmer” until something or someone pushes the lid off the pot, at which point, they may “erupt” or “explode” into mass-led violence against the hated group (Goldhagen 1996; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002). The “ethnic fear” thesis focuses not on cultural constants, but on elite ambitions and moves. According to this model, elites foment mass fear of the ethnic “other” using extremist media, organized riots, arbitrary arrests, and other known techniques, in pursuit of their political goals. Ethnic fears are not an extant feature of group identities, but a resource that political entrepreneurs exploit to their own advantage. Ethnic publics heed calls to support violent campaigns because it is rational for them to 3. Scholars have also devised explanations for specific cases of mass killing or genocide. Explanations for the Rwandan genocide cover a wide range of explanatory factors, including structural violence (Uvin 1998); the effects of media (Chalk 1999; Chrétien et al. 1995); identities created under colonialism (Mamdani 2001), to name a few. These explanations are generally not proffered as general theories of mass or ethnic violence, however. This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 5 do so. The basis of that rationality depends on the theory. In Barry Posen’s (1993) framework, it is rational for ethnic groups to try to increase their security when the state has collapsed or can no longer guarantee all citizens’ well-being. According to Rui J.P. de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast (1999), it is rational for masses to accept what elites say because the risk of possible annihilation is too great should elite exhortations turn out to be true. For Russell Hardin (1995), it is rational for people to identify with their ethnic group because ethnic groups provide coordination power, which enables groups to attain their goals. In all three scenarios, no counterdiscourse or countermovement exists that can offer people an alternative set of frames or options; this leaves ethnic groups no other choice but to line up behind their ethnic leaders. In both the ethnic fear and ethnic hatred approaches, the causal chain works as follows. When crises occur, the insecurity (and opportunity) of the moment inflames people’s fears and hatreds. Once activated, these emotions drive Serbs to kill Muslims, Muslims to kill Hindus, and Hutu to kill Tutsi. Each step leads inexorably to the next. Individual motives and interests are immaterial to the outcome, because under crisis conditions, motives and interests converge. They become shared by all members of the same ethnic group. The result of this convergence is precisely what the architects of these projects intend: masses of one group go after masses of the other. Both approaches offer intuitively compelling explanations for mass violence. Large-scale crises, such as war, do seem to bring out people’s latent prejudices and fears which, in turn, do seem to push people to line up with their own against the perceived enemy or threat. In the wake of Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, for example, the Roosevelt administration authorized the forced relocation of all United States residents of Japanese ancestry, the majority of whom were American citizens, to “internment camps” in the country’s interior. There was no public outcry or protest against this mass deportation, evidence perhaps of white America uniting behind its leaders against a threatening racial group. Facile readings of history, however, rarely hold up to closer scrutiny. While war may indeed generate widespread fears and prejudices, violence does not become the only or inevitable outcome. Even in wartime, ethnic masses do not act as a single unit, but as a variety of groups and groupings that do not always follow ethnic lines. Indeed, the most common strategy that people follow during wartime is neutrality, not unequivocal support for one side over another (Kalyvas 2006). Neutrality often manifests as acquiescence to whichever side is in power. Such acquiescence is not an indicatorThis of tacit support of those in power, but may be a function of other content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 6 Killing Neighbors factors. As Ian Kershaw (1987, 372) argues in the case of ordinary Germans during World War II, for example, the lack of public protest against deportations of Jews to the East did not signal the public’s support for these policies, but rather, its indifference to them, an indifference borne of people’s “concern for matters only of immediate and personal relevance.” As Chip Gagnon (2004, 27) similarly points out in the case of the Balkan wars of the early 1990s, many people chose silence as “the least evil” option. As these and other scholars point out, fear and insecurity do not always push all, or even most, people to violence. In fact, fear can have just the opposite effect, leading people to retreat further “into the private sphere” (Kershaw 1987, 372). Responses to other genocides also seem consistent with the findings of Kalyvas, Kershaw, and Gagnon. Even during campaigns of genocide, people do not necessarily act as ethnic blocks. The ethnic hatred and ethnic fear theses do not anticipate this level of fragmentation. As a result, both models end up raising more questions than they answer when applied to the Rwandan case. First, if it was overwhelming hatreds or fears that drove hundreds of thousands of ordinary Hutu to participate in the genocide, then what explains the hundreds of thousands who did not participate?4 Second, if collective hatreds and fears were powerful enough to motivate ordinary people to kill, then why did local leaders have to force so many to participate in the violence? Why did everyone not join in the slaughter willingly? Third, if crisis really does push people to line up with their own, then what explains all the instances in which Hutu crossed ethnic lines to help Tutsi? Or cases where killers targeted other Hutu? Neither approach can answer these questions because neither expects such patterns to arise in the first place. In addition to raising questions they cannot answer, both approaches have little to say about the specific form that genocidal violence took in Rwanda. So consistent was the manner in which killers carried out their murderous task that Scott Straus (2004b; 2006), in a masterful analysis of the genocide, is able to use these features to distinguish genocidal violence from other forms of violence that were occurring at the same time. As Straus (2004b, 86) writes: “Genocidal violence is characterized by public, indiscriminate attacks against Tutsis, often in broad daylight and by large numbers of attackers. Isolated, sporadic, surreptitious attacks do not 4. Straus (2004a, 94–95) estimates between 175,000 and 210,000 total perpetrators, of whom 90 percent would have been “non-hardcore civilian perpetrators.” More recently, gacaca (local court) proceedings have led to accusations against half a million people (Waldorf 2007, 267). This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 7 constitute genocidal violence.” What Straus does not tell us, however, is why genocidal violence would have these characteristics in the first place. Why would the killings be public? Why would they be performed by large numbers of attackers, especially in cases where the number of victims was relatively small? And why would these types of attacks constitute genocidal violence while “sporadic, surreptitious attacks” do not? For some types of political violence, form is what defines them. By definition, riots need crowds and lynchings a target. It would make little sense to analyze either type of violence without taking into account the public nature of the acts, the way rioters choose their targets and sites (Horowitz 2001), and in the case of lynchings, the public display of the victim’s body and the severing of body parts for souvenirs (McGovern 1982; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Unlike riots and lynchings, however, there is nothing inherent in the definition of genocide that would warrant one method of mass murder over another. This leaves Straus to derive his definition inductively—from the evidence. His definition is consistent with his own data as well as that of other studies of the genocide (e.g., Mironko 2004). The killings in Rwanda were committed by groups, not individuals. These groups were …
Purchase answer to see full attachment

Theories that attempt to explain why formerly peaceable neighbors kill one another in genocidal violence focus on top-down factors, such as the state, as well as bottom-up factors, such as group ties and social interaction.

(a)  Read through the theories of the Rwandan genocide put forth by Mamdani (2001), Straus (2006), andFujii (2009).

? (b)Using the personal interviews with perpetrators in the Hatzfield (2006) reading to support your argument:

i.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of identity in the decision to participate in geno-cide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or against that argument.

ii.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of state institutions in the decision to partici-pate in genocide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or against thatargument.

iii.  Describe one author’s argument about the role of social pressure and groups in the decision to participate in genocide.  Discuss one piece of evidence from the Hatzfield interviews for or againstthat argument.

(c)  In answering this question, make sure to describe at least two authors’ arguments, and to use at least three different pieces of evidence.

 

Explanation & Answer length: 1200 word

UNFORMATTED ATTACHMENT PREVIEW

Killing Neighbors WEBS OF VIOLENCE I N R WA N D A Lee Ann Fujii Cornell University Press Ithaca and London This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:26:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Copyright © 2009 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2009 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2011 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing neighbors : webs of violence in Rwanda / Lee Ann Fujii. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-4705-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-8014-7713-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Genocide—Rwanda. 2. Violence—Rwanda. 3. Ethnic conflict—Rwanda. 4. Political violence—Rwanda. 5. Rwanda— History—Civil War, 1990-1993—Atrocities. 6. Rwanda—History— Civil War, 1994—Atrocities. 7. Rwanda—Ethnic relations. I. Title. DT450.435.F85 2009 967.57104’2–dc22 2008034134 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu. Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Paperback printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:26:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction Genocide among Neighbors Édouard did not look the part. None of the rural men and women who participated in the Rwandan genocide did. Their lives revolved around work, chores, children, and church, not mass murder. Édouard was typical in this regard. He was born in a rural community rung by the Virunga Mountains, the range made famous by Dian Fossey’s gorillas. He grew up to become a farmer, married, had four children. Among his neighbors was a Tutsi family. He and his neighbor were not close, but each “still played the role of neighbor,” helping one another and sharing good times. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a guerrilla army comprised of mostly Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, Édouard began to hear rumors that his own Tutsi neighbor—and indeed, everyone’s Tutsi neighbor—were secretly supporting the RPF. For Édouard, the RPF threat had become all too real. In January 1991, the rebel army had launched an attack on the nearest town, less than twenty kilometers away. To help protect his community, Édouard and a dozen other men arranged to go to his Tutsi neighbor’s house to root out the RPF accomplices the man was allegedly hiding. When the group arrived, several men surrounded the house. Édouard threw rocks on the roof to make the man come out. The man emerged, brandishing a machete, and managed to strike the first blow. The group killed him instantly. Inside they found no accomplices, only the man’s frightened sisters and mother. The murder of Édouard’s neighbor at the hands of other neighbors was no isolated incident. In a wholly different part of the country lived Olivier, a man who spent his childhood years in Kigali. His family eventually moved south, to the center of the country, where Olivier grew up to become aThis mason. He married and had seven children. Though his own wife content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 2 Killing Neighbors was Hutu, other members of his family had married Tutsi. Olivier also had several Tutsi neighbors. Close interrelations with Tutsi were typical for the region. When the war began in October 1990, daily life continued as before. Political parties were starting to form, which threatened the oneparty state that had ruled Rwanda for nearly two decades. The emergence of new parties created palpable tensions, even violence, in many parts of the country, but Olivier’s family steered clear of politics and experienced no problems. Everything changed on 6 April 1994, when assailants shot down the plane carrying President Habyarimana as it tried to land at the airport in Kigali. Almost immediately, a new authority took over Olivier’s secteur and began organizing local men to burn and loot Tutsi homes. Olivier was among those recruited. He was a particularly active recruit, never hesitating to carry out any order the new authority issued. Even when the order came to kill all the Tutsi, Olivier obliged. He obliged so often that by his own estimate, he took part in nearly every killing in his community. What made Édouard and Olivier turn on their Tutsi neighbors? What made these men kill? The genocide was no homegrown project. It was sponsored and conceived from above, by a small group of powerful extremists in President Habyarimana’s regime. These mighty few objected to the power-sharing terms of a recently signed peace agreement between Habyarimana and the RPF. Through genocide, they sought to maintain their monopoly on power. The slaughter began on 6 April 1994, shortly after assailants shot down the plane carrying the president. Within hours, specially trained militia, soldiers, and Presidential Guard began going door to door with lists of targets, which included anyone—Hutu or Tutsi—not firmly in the extremists’ camp. The killers dispatched their victims with gruesome efficiency. Militia simultaneously set up roadblocks across the city to prevent escape, killing anyone with a Tutsi identity card and anyone who “looked” Tutsi. Outside the capital, the violence followed a different path. Killings began at different times in different regions (Straus 2006, 53–64). Soldiers, professional militia, and National Police continued to play a leading role in perpetrating violence, but rural residents also did their part. Local elites and political entrepreneurs used the crisis of the president’s assassination to seize power in their communities and began enlisting residents into genocide. Some people refused. Others found ways to avoid participating. Many, however, joined in the killings. Despite long-standing, mostlyThis amicable, relations with their victims, these peasant-killers went content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 3 about their task in determined fashion. They trapped victims at roadblocks, lured them to public buildings, and descended on their homes and hiding places. They killed the young and old, the healthy and infirm, men as well as women, mostly Tutsi but thousands of Hutu as well. What explains this transformation from peasant to génocidaire? How do ordinary people come to commit mass violence against their own neighbors, friends, and family? The question of intimate mass violence constitutes a central puzzle in the study of political violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 846). The question is even more puzzling in the African context since most African states lack the ability to mobilize outside capital cities or other urban centers (Straus 2004b, 12). From a rationalist perspective, popular participation in mass slaughter is puzzling because people are better off under conditions of peace than violence. It makes no sense for masses to support elite projects of genocide or ethnic cleansing, when it is the masses who incur most of the costs, and elites, most of the benefits (de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999, 262). The puzzle becomes even more disturbing when the targets of violence are people whom the killers have known as friends, neighbors, and family. Neighbors are not supposed to kill neighbors, let alone commit genocide against them. Indeed, long-standing, interethnic ties of the sort that typified relations in Rwanda should preclude, not facilitate, participation in mass violence (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Varshney 1997).1 Killing at close range, moreover, is grisly work, as the ordinary men of Police Battalion 101 knew firsthand after marching thousands of Jewish civilians into the forest and shooting them in the back of the neck (Browning 1992). So, too, is killing a person one sees as occupying the same “moral universe” as oneself, and thus entitled to the same norms of protection (Fein 1979).2 What is perhaps most difficult of all is to kill a person one knows and regards in positive terms, for killing kith and kin is more than just a physical act; it is an act of social violation. It destroys not just bodies, but bonds. 1. Scholars have also noted social capital’s “dark side” (Portes 1998, 15–18; Colletta and Cullen 2000; Mann 2005, 21; Kalyvas 2006, 14). 2. A clear example of Fein’s notion of “moral universe” is found in Walzer (1977), where he quotes from memoirs of soldiers who refrained from shooting an enemy combatant when the enemy soldier did something that made him look “human,” such as lighting a cigarette or pulling up his pants. As Walzer (1977, 139) explains: “A soldier who looks funny is not at that moment a military threat; he is not a fighting man but simply a man, and one does not kill men.” This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 4 Killing Neighbors Foils and Foibles: A Second Look at Ethnicity-based Approaches The usual approach to resolving this puzzle is to point to ethnicity as the key driver of violence. In ethnicity-based approaches, violence is the outcome of ethnic group relations, which are inherently competitive and often antagonistic. The type of violence that occurs, such as atrocities or mass murder, are supposed indicators of the power of ethnic levers at work. The more extensive or brutal the violence, the greater the antagonisms must have been. Ethnicity-based approaches thus locate causes in the nature of ethnic groups themselves—the collective attributes or tendencies that unite people under a common ethnic label. These attributes and tendencies may be constructed or ancient. They may be modern or old, real or imagined. No matter their origin, they turn Serbs, Sunni, and Hutu into clearly bounded ethnic groups. Under the right conditions, these approaches assert, ethnic groups will commit violence against “enemy” groups. Two of the most commonly posited pathways to mass-based violence are “ethnic hatreds” and “ethnic fears.”3 For purposes of clarity, I treat these two approaches as distinct though some scholars combine the two. The “ethnic hatred” thesis views collective hatreds as an integral part of ethnic group identities. According to this thesis, ethnic hatreds can persist over generations, even centuries, through myth, memory, or both. Despite the passage of time, these hatreds do not necessarily lessen or alter but remain dormant and even “simmer” until something or someone pushes the lid off the pot, at which point, they may “erupt” or “explode” into mass-led violence against the hated group (Goldhagen 1996; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002). The “ethnic fear” thesis focuses not on cultural constants, but on elite ambitions and moves. According to this model, elites foment mass fear of the ethnic “other” using extremist media, organized riots, arbitrary arrests, and other known techniques, in pursuit of their political goals. Ethnic fears are not an extant feature of group identities, but a resource that political entrepreneurs exploit to their own advantage. Ethnic publics heed calls to support violent campaigns because it is rational for them to 3. Scholars have also devised explanations for specific cases of mass killing or genocide. Explanations for the Rwandan genocide cover a wide range of explanatory factors, including structural violence (Uvin 1998); the effects of media (Chalk 1999; Chrétien et al. 1995); identities created under colonialism (Mamdani 2001), to name a few. These explanations are generally not proffered as general theories of mass or ethnic violence, however. This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 5 do so. The basis of that rationality depends on the theory. In Barry Posen’s (1993) framework, it is rational for ethnic groups to try to increase their security when the state has collapsed or can no longer guarantee all citizens’ well-being. According to Rui J.P. de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast (1999), it is rational for masses to accept what elites say because the risk of possible annihilation is too great should elite exhortations turn out to be true. For Russell Hardin (1995), it is rational for people to identify with their ethnic group because ethnic groups provide coordination power, which enables groups to attain their goals. In all three scenarios, no counterdiscourse or countermovement exists that can offer people an alternative set of frames or options; this leaves ethnic groups no other choice but to line up behind their ethnic leaders. In both the ethnic fear and ethnic hatred approaches, the causal chain works as follows. When crises occur, the insecurity (and opportunity) of the moment inflames people’s fears and hatreds. Once activated, these emotions drive Serbs to kill Muslims, Muslims to kill Hindus, and Hutu to kill Tutsi. Each step leads inexorably to the next. Individual motives and interests are immaterial to the outcome, because under crisis conditions, motives and interests converge. They become shared by all members of the same ethnic group. The result of this convergence is precisely what the architects of these projects intend: masses of one group go after masses of the other. Both approaches offer intuitively compelling explanations for mass violence. Large-scale crises, such as war, do seem to bring out people’s latent prejudices and fears which, in turn, do seem to push people to line up with their own against the perceived enemy or threat. In the wake of Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, for example, the Roosevelt administration authorized the forced relocation of all United States residents of Japanese ancestry, the majority of whom were American citizens, to “internment camps” in the country’s interior. There was no public outcry or protest against this mass deportation, evidence perhaps of white America uniting behind its leaders against a threatening racial group. Facile readings of history, however, rarely hold up to closer scrutiny. While war may indeed generate widespread fears and prejudices, violence does not become the only or inevitable outcome. Even in wartime, ethnic masses do not act as a single unit, but as a variety of groups and groupings that do not always follow ethnic lines. Indeed, the most common strategy that people follow during wartime is neutrality, not unequivocal support for one side over another (Kalyvas 2006). Neutrality often manifests as acquiescence to whichever side is in power. Such acquiescence is not an indicatorThis of tacit support of those in power, but may be a function of other content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 6 Killing Neighbors factors. As Ian Kershaw (1987, 372) argues in the case of ordinary Germans during World War II, for example, the lack of public protest against deportations of Jews to the East did not signal the public’s support for these policies, but rather, its indifference to them, an indifference borne of people’s “concern for matters only of immediate and personal relevance.” As Chip Gagnon (2004, 27) similarly points out in the case of the Balkan wars of the early 1990s, many people chose silence as “the least evil” option. As these and other scholars point out, fear and insecurity do not always push all, or even most, people to violence. In fact, fear can have just the opposite effect, leading people to retreat further “into the private sphere” (Kershaw 1987, 372). Responses to other genocides also seem consistent with the findings of Kalyvas, Kershaw, and Gagnon. Even during campaigns of genocide, people do not necessarily act as ethnic blocks. The ethnic hatred and ethnic fear theses do not anticipate this level of fragmentation. As a result, both models end up raising more questions than they answer when applied to the Rwandan case. First, if it was overwhelming hatreds or fears that drove hundreds of thousands of ordinary Hutu to participate in the genocide, then what explains the hundreds of thousands who did not participate?4 Second, if collective hatreds and fears were powerful enough to motivate ordinary people to kill, then why did local leaders have to force so many to participate in the violence? Why did everyone not join in the slaughter willingly? Third, if crisis really does push people to line up with their own, then what explains all the instances in which Hutu crossed ethnic lines to help Tutsi? Or cases where killers targeted other Hutu? Neither approach can answer these questions because neither expects such patterns to arise in the first place. In addition to raising questions they cannot answer, both approaches have little to say about the specific form that genocidal violence took in Rwanda. So consistent was the manner in which killers carried out their murderous task that Scott Straus (2004b; 2006), in a masterful analysis of the genocide, is able to use these features to distinguish genocidal violence from other forms of violence that were occurring at the same time. As Straus (2004b, 86) writes: “Genocidal violence is characterized by public, indiscriminate attacks against Tutsis, often in broad daylight and by large numbers of attackers. Isolated, sporadic, surreptitious attacks do not 4. Straus (2004a, 94–95) estimates between 175,000 and 210,000 total perpetrators, of whom 90 percent would have been “non-hardcore civilian perpetrators.” More recently, gacaca (local court) proceedings have led to accusations against half a million people (Waldorf 2007, 267). This content downloaded from 137.110.37.73 on Sat, 30 Nov 2019 18:27:16 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Introduction 7 constitute genocidal violence.” What Straus does not tell us, however, is why genocidal violence would have these characteristics in the first place. Why would the killings be public? Why would they be performed by large numbers of attackers, especially in cases where the number of victims was relatively small? And why would these types of attacks constitute genocidal violence while “sporadic, surreptitious attacks” do not? For some types of political violence, form is what defines them. By definition, riots need crowds and lynchings a target. It would make little sense to analyze either type of violence without taking into account the public nature of the acts, the way rioters choose their targets and sites (Horowitz 2001), and in the case of lynchings, the public display of the victim’s body and the severing of body parts for souvenirs (McGovern 1982; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Unlike riots and lynchings, however, there is nothing inherent in the definition of genocide that would warrant one method of mass murder over another. This leaves Straus to derive his definition inductively—from the evidence. His definition is consistent with his own data as well as that of other studies of the genocide (e.g., Mironko 2004). The killings in Rwanda were committed by groups, not individuals. These groups were …
Purchase answer to see full attachment
Do you need a similar assignment done for you from scratch? We have qualified writers to help you
Use our paper writing service to score better and meet your deadlines.
Order Now