Con Essay (5 pages)Con Introduction: The author (fill in) argues for the following controversial conclusion (give conclusion). He bases his argument on two objectionable premises: (a) (give first premise) and (b) (give second premise). It will be the contention of this essay that these premises are mistaken thus rendering the conclusion unproven.

I’m working on a philosophy project and need an explanation to help me understand better.

 

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The requirement is to choose either pro con wright about it as much as you can since it is a philosophy subject it require 5 pages but would it be more like to right more. I have attached pdf file you will choose on argument there’re 8 argument from page 19-35 you will choose on argument. the book size is too big and I could not uploaded the is the link to access the book. https://sa1lib.org/book/5399184/3ec9e2 I also try to copy and past the book but it would be more clear toupee the link ands the book.

Pro Essay (5 pages)

Pro Introduction: The author (fill in) argues for the following controversial conclusion: (give conclusion). He supports this conclusion with the following premises: (a) (give first premise) and (b) (give second premise). This essay will examine each premise in the light of objectors and then defend the author from these objections.

The possible objection to the first premise (give the objection(s)).

Reply to the first objection (give pointed reply).

The possible objection to the second premise (give the objection(s)).

Reply to the second objection (give pointed reply).

Theoretical observation (this is a broad theoretical groundwork upon which the whole argument rests)

Significance (this is a concrete example from the world in which these issues play out today).

Con Essay (5 pages)Con Introduction: The author (fill in) argues for the following controversial conclusion (give conclusion). He bases his argument on two objectionable premises: (a) (give first premise) and (b) (give second premise). It will be the contention of this essay that these premises are mistaken thus rendering the conclusion unproven.

Objection to the first premise (give objection).

Counter-refutation by the author (imagine how the author would respond to your objection)

Counter-refutation against the author (show how the author’s response is inadequate)

Objection to the second premise (give objection).

Counter-refutation by the author (imagine how the author would respond to your objection)

Counter-refutation against the author (show how the author’s response is inadequate)

Theoretical observation (this is a broad theoretical groundwork upon which the whole argument rests)

Significance (this is a concrete example from the world in which these issues play out today).

 

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Virtue Ethics with Selections 2 from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle was the first systematic writer on ethical theory from the ancient Greek world. Today, we classify his general approach as virtue (arete) ethics or ethics of character. This approach is aimed more at creating good decision-makers rather than creating a decision theory mechanism which will allow anyone to plug in the relevant data and derive an action recommendation. The presupposition is this: people of good character make right choices. These spring out of their well-formed disposition so that they can merely appeal to their habits to act rightly. Aristotle also addresses a number of critical questions about ethics as applied broadly to the society at large. These include such disparate topics as: justice, culpability, and friendship. This presentation of Aristotle will concentrate upon nine critical presentations by 1 Argument 2.1: All deliberative/methodological actions are about normative goodness (Book One. Chapter 1 1094a 1–7) Every functionally-based art and every methodologically-based investigation and likewise each practical pursuit seems to aim at some good. Thus, the good is rightly said to be that to which all things aim. It is also true that within these ends concerning the arts and sciences there is a marked variety. Sometimes the end is the mere practicing of the art, itself. At others it is some end product that is separate from the practicing of the art. Argument 2.2: The human good is the soul actively and excellently expressing reason (Book One. Chapter 7, 1098a 8–17) 1 The translation is a revision of W. D. Ross’s translation, Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1908). The Greek text I am following the text of J. Bywater, Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894) © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 19 M. Boylan, Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3030-24872-7_2 Aristotle so that the reader might get a general sampling of his presentation. In each case I will present the conclusion of the argument first. This will offer a challenge to the reader that she will have to find the supporting material for that conclusion from the primary text translation provided. 20 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics If the function of humans is the active exercise of the rational soul’s according to rationality or at least not in dissociation from rational principles, and if we acknowledge the function of an individual and especially a good individual of the same class (for example, a harper and a good harper, and so with other classes) to be generally the same but differing in excellence (arete) in fulfilling the function (ergon) of his case. (I mean that the function, ergon, of a harper is to play the harp and that of a good harper is to play the harp excellently.) If this analysis is correct, then we declare the function of humans is a particular form of life and we define that form as the exercise of the capacities of the soul (psuche) in accord with reason. Argument 2.3: The noble man’s happiness does not fall easily away and, once diminished, does not easily return (Book One. Chapter 10, 1100b 22-1101a 7) Now many events happen by chance (tuche), and these events differ in magni- tude. Small [25] pieces of good luck or of its opposite clearly do not alter one’s whole life one way or the other, yet a succession of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (since they themselves embellish one’s life, and the way they are utilized can reveal nobility and virtue), while great and frequent misfortunes will crush and disfigure happiness; for they both bring pain [30] with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in adversity nobility shines through, when a person bears with resignation repeated and severe misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul. If activities are, as we have said, what gives life its character, no supremely happy (makarios) individual can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and [1101a] base. For the person who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life in a seemly way and always makes the best of circumstances as a good general makes the most effective military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoes [5] out of the leather given him; and so with all other craftsmen and professions. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable—though he will not reach blessedness 2 Argument 2.4: Virtue is an active state that is achieved by rationally choosing the mean (Book Two, Chapters 5–6 1105b 20-1107a 8) Next we must consider what virtue (arete) is. Things that are found in the soul (psyche) are of three kinds: emotions (pathos), capacities (dunameis), or states (hexis), virtue must be one of these. By emotions I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general whatever engenders pleasure or pain. By capacities the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g., [25] of becoming angry, or afraid, or feeling pity. 2 Of course, Priam, King of Troy, was put into a bad situation when Paris, his son, took Helen (wife of Menelaus) to Troy. This started the Trojan War and resulted in Hector, Priam’s favorite son and likely successor, to be killed by Achilles and consequently the fall of his city. This is, indeed, an example of bad luck. (makarios), even if he meets with the bad luck (tuche) of Priam. 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 21 By states the things in which we stand well or badly with reference to feelings, e.g., with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions. [30] Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions. This is because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our emotions. We are neither praised nor blamed for our emotions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger [1106a] blamed, but only the man who feels it in a particular way). But we are praised or blamed for our virtues and our vices. Again, we don’t feel anger and fear from choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or [5] involve choice. Besides, in respect of the emotions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed [to move] in a particular way. For these reasons also they are not capacities either for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the emotions. We have the capacities by nature, but we are not made good or bad by 3 that they are states [of character]. Thus, we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus. [15] Chapter 6. It is not enough merely to describe virtue as a state, but we must also say what sort of species the state is. We may say, then, that every virtue or excellence both (a) brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and (b) makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g., the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work (ergon) good; [20] for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself [intrinsic] and good at running and at carrying its rider in the face of the enemy [extrinsic]. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be a state [of character] which makes a man good and which makes him perform his function well. [25] How this is to happen we have stated already,4 but it will be made plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take a larger part, a smaller part, or an equal part, and that either in terms of the object itself or relative to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and deficiency. [30] By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for everyone. But the intermediate relatively to us is that which is neither superfluous nor deficient—and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it [35] exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount [four units]; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so. If ten pounds [1106b] of food are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow 3 1103a 18-b2. 41104a 11–27. nature; we have spoken of this before. [10] If, then, the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, all that remains is 22 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to [5] take it, or too little—too little for Milo5 too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true for running and wrestling. Thus, a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this. The mean is thus not in the object but relative to us. This, then is how every science produces its work well—by looking to the mean and [10] judging its product by this standard (so that we often say of good products that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroys the goodness of the product, while the mean preserves it. Good craftsmen, as we say, look to this in their work). Further, if virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue [15] must have the quality of aiming at the mean. By virtue I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with emotions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the mean. For instance, one can feel fear and confidence or desire or anger or pity and experience pleasure and pain in general either too much and too [20] little, and in both these cases not well. But to feel these emotions at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the mean. Now virtue is concerned with [25] emotions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is a defect, while the mean is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen it aims at what is intermediate. [30] Again, there are many ways to err (since evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), but there is only one way to be correct. This is why error is easy and rectitude diffi- cult—to miss the mark is easy. To hit the mark is difficult. And for this reason, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice and the mean characteristic of virtue. [35] “For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.”6 [1107a] Virtue, then is a state [of character] concerned with choice of actions, lying in a mean, i.e., a mean relative to us, this being determined by reference to reason, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would deter- mine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on deficiency. It is a mean also for this reason because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what [5] is right in both emotions and actions, while virtue finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence with respect to its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is the thorough observance of a mean, with regard to what is best and right. 5 6 A famous wrestler. The source of this quotation is unknown. 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 23 Argument 2.5: Moral praise or blame can only be accorded to voluntary actions; involuntary actions due to force or ignorance of particulars occasioned by pain and regret mitigate blame. (Book Three, Chapter 1, 1109b 30-1111b 5) Virtue is concerned with passions and actions. Praise or blame are assessed on voluntary passions and actions. Those passions and actions that are involuntary deserve pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary. This distinction is necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honors and of punishments. [35] Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under com- pulsion or [1110a] owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g., if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power. But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble [5] object (e.g., if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of this sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the [10] abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but only on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary,’ must be used with [15] reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily when the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him. Further, the things that constitute the moving principle are in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such mixed actions, therefore, are voluntary but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose the act in itself [without the extenuating circumstances]. [20] For such actions man are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful in return for great noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person. On some actions praise is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he [25] ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one could reasonably withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful sufferings. Thus the events that “forced” Euripides’ Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at [30] what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not. [1110b] What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances 24 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the agent contributes nothing. Other circumstances are involuntary in them- selves, but choice worthy on this occasion and whose moving principle is in the agent. These are in themselves [5] involuntary, but now and in return for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary acts; for actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases. But if some were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a compelling power, forcing [10] us from without, all acts would be for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do everything they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain, but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with pleasure. Thus, it is absurd to make external circumstances [by themselves] responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects [15] responsible for base acts. The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, the person compelled contributing nothing. Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it is only what produces pain and repentance that is in voluntary. For the man who has done something owing to [20] ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of igno- rance he who repents is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not repent may, since he is different, be called nonvoluntary agent; for since he differs from the other, it is better that he should have a name of his own. Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in igno- rance; for the [25] man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mention, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad. But the [30] term ‘involuntary’ tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage—for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed),7 but ignorance of particulars, i.e., of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both [1111a] pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also [5] what (e.g., what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g., he may think his act will conduce to some one’s safety), and how he is doing it (e.g., whether gently or violently). Now all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might 7 Cf. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law excuses no one). 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 25 be ignorant, as for instance people say “it slipped out of their mouths as they were [10] speaking,” or “they did not know it was a secret,” as Aeschylus said of the mysteries,8 or a man might say he “let it go off when he merely wanted to show it working,” as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one’s son was an enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumice-stone; or one might give a man a draught to [15] save him, and really kill him; or one might wa …
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